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And it’s good night Vienna. How (not) to deal with the populist radical right: the 
Conservatives, UKIP and some lessons from the heartland 
 
The Conservative Party is facing nothing less than a transformation in its electoral 
environment. Shielded for so long by the country’s plurality electoral system, the Tories have 
never really experienced truly serious competitive pressure on their right flank. Even when 
the National Front (in the 1970s) and the British National Party (in the 2000s) experienced 
short-lived successes, the threat they presented never came close to that posed by populist 
radical right parties (PRRPs) in continental Europe (Goodwin, 2007). There, since the 1990s, 
the success of PRRPs’ anti-system, anti-elite and anti-immigration appeals have put 
mainstream actors in a number of countries under significant, even existential pressure 
(Kitschelt and McGann, 1997; Eatwell, 2000; Downs, 2001; Bale, 2003 and 2008; Carter, 
2005; van Spanje and van der Brug, 2007; Meguid, 2008; van Spanje, 2010; Akkerman, 2012; 
de Lange, 2012; Mudde, 2013). In many continental European democracies this has led to 
responses ranging from the use of similar (if sometimes slightly diluted) rhetoric to the radical 
right, through the adoption of its policies, right up to its co-option into coalition government. 
Not for nothing, then, have scholars spoken of ‘contagion effects’ (Harmel and Svasand, 
1997; Pettigrew, 1998; Minkenberg, 2002; Schain, 2002; Norris, 2005). 
 
In the UK, the populist radical right has come nowhere near government and there is precious 
little hard evidence that recourse to restrictive rhetoric or policies on immigration on the part 
of the Conservative Party has been driven by its occasional concerns about far-right 
incursions into its electoral territory and its organisation (see Pitchford, 2011). Instead, it has 
reflected a more prosaic concern on the part of the Tories to achieve and maintain the upper 
hand over their mainstream Labour rival and a desire to show they are in touch with public 
opinion on the issue (see Bale, 2013). However, with the recent electoral gains of the United 
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Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the threat from the populist radical right has suddenly 
become rather more serious (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Lynch and Whitaker, 2012 and Webb 
and Bale, forthcoming), arguably prompting the Tory leadership to respond more actively by 
sharpening its message on immigration. The government that it leads was already committed 
to reducing net migration into the UK from ‘the hundreds to the tens of thousands’. But since 
suffering a swing to UKIP in local elections and by-elections in the Spring of 2013, it has also 
begun exploring ever more ingenious ways – from additional legislation to so-called ‘Go-
Home’ vans and the threat to withdraw from the European Convention of Human rights and 
exclude foreigners from social security and child care – of signalling to the public that it is 
going to make life even more difficult for current and prospective immigrants. 
 
This raises a crucial question, namely is this upping of the ante and turning of the screw the 
right way for the Conservative Party to go if it wants to secure its position vis-à-vis its 
populist challenger or could there instead be some serious downsides? In other words, will 
some kind of feint, or even a genuine shift, towards UKIP by the Conservative Party prove to 
be a panacea or will it instead see them opening Pandora’s Box? This article addresses this 
strategic question for British Conservatives by openly looking to learn from overseas 
experience and from one outstanding but crucial case. We begin by discussing the 
Conservatives’ strategies vis-à-vis the British far-right in the distant and recent past, with a 
focus on the party’s approach to immigration. Then we link this discussion to experiences 
from other Conservative parties in continental Europe and in particular the Austrian centre-
right People’s Party (ÖVP), which has competed against the populist radical right ‘Freedom 
Party’ (FPÖ) over almost three decades and has, in the course of so doing, tried all sorts of 
ways to deal with it, few if any of which, as we go on to show, have enjoyed lasting success.  
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Clearly the Austrian case differs from the British. Most obviously, it has a proportional 
electoral system, as of course do almost all other European polities – one of the reasons 
perhaps why it can sometimes seem easier in the UK to retreat into parochialism and 
exceptionalism rather than attempting to draw thought-provoking parallels. Nor, of course, are 
the parties we are comparing exactly the same. Unlike, UKIP, for instance, the FPÖ can trace 
it roots back to the nineteenth century, yet in the twenty-first it has shown itself far more 
adept than at attracting the support of younger voters than its British counterpart. As for the 
ÖVP, as a Christian Democratic rather than a conservative party, it has to take much more 
account than does its Tory counterpart of countervailing, faith-based arguments for charitable 
compassion; it also finds it far more difficult, as a pro-EU, internationalist party, than the 
Conservative Party does to match the populist radial right’s Eurosceptic appeal. That said, the 
similarities are equally strong and striking. The FPÖ and UKIP are both leadership-dominated 
parties; their votes are disproportionately drawn from men with relatively low-levels of 
education and social status; they are also a repository of protest votes against the mainstream 
parties, and mobilise in particular on immigration and integration and hostility toward the EU. 
Meanwhile, the ÖVP, although it often has to govern in a grand coalition, is clearly the 
country’s predominant centre-right party representing socially conservative and pro-
market/pro-property voters as well as the interests of the country’s businesses; moreover, like 
its British counterpart, it has had to cope with a disruptive rival on the right after decades of 
what was fairly comfortable competition with social democrats and liberals. 
 
Clearly, that disruptive rival arrived on the scene much earlier and more successfully in 
Austria than it did in the UK, or indeed in most over European countries. But that is precisely 
why the Austrian experience repays careful study. Because the populist radical right presence 
in that country been amongst the longest and enduring anywhere in the world, the country’s 
mainstream centre-right has had the time and opportunity to run the gamut of responses to that 
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presence, all the way from trying to play and/or put it down, through aping its appeals at and 
between elections, to, eventually, a six-year coalition government between the mainstream 
centre-right and PRRPs – the longest of its kind in Western Europe, where such governments 
still of course represent the exception rather than the rule (Mudde, 2013, 4). The disappointing 
results of all those responses should, we argue, give pause for thought to anyone in Britain 
believing they have some sort of silver-bullet solution to the threat that UKIP poses to the 
Conservative Party, whether they involve freezing it out, matching its demands or moving to 
co-opt it. Indeed, even the most radical of these solutions, namely changing the electoral 
system so that UKIP, rather than simply eroding the Tories’ vote, also becomes a potential 
coalition partner (see Bale, 2006), is unlikely to solve the problem in the long term. 
 
 
This time it’s serious: the radical right in Britain 
For a very long time, and even as the Liberals/SDP/Liberal Democrats as well as Scottish and 
Welsh regionalist parties effectively turned Britain into a two-and-a-half-party system (Webb, 
2000, 9), the Conservative Party faced no serious competitors on the right hand side of the 
political spectrum. British radical right parties for too long “remained too closely aligned to 
the ‘fascist tradition’, with their leadership, organisation and policies too heavily influenced 
by Nazism” (Goodwin, 2007, 242) and failed to develop ‘winning-formulas’ that would 
appeal to centre-right voters too (Kitschelt, 1996, 241-2 and de Lange, 2007, 416-7). 
Meanwhile, the majoritarian electoral system helped keep any right wing political force out of 
parliament, depriving these parties of publicity and resources that other PRRPs on the 
continent have successfully tapped over time. The BNP, for example, achieved significant 
gains in the local elections of 2002/03 & 2006 and experienced an “international” 
breakthrough by gaining two seats in the 2009 European Parliament election. However, it 
failed to shed its toxic image and performed poorly in the 2010 general elections (where it 
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took 1.9%) and to all intents and purposes collapsed in the 2012 local elections (Goodwin, 
2013). 
 
The recent rise of UKIP, however, has catalysed the debate on whether the British radical 
right has at last managed to identify broader voter potential and to develop more promising 
formulas for mobilization (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). UKIP’s rise to prominence began with 
successes in the 2004 European elections (gaining 12 seats) and continued in 2009 (13 seats). 
On the local level it achieved its best result in the 2013 council elections (gaining 147 council 
seats and achieving around 20% of the overall vote-share). In the same year it also performed 
very strongly in parliamentary by-elections, beating the Conservatives into third place in 
Eastleigh in February 2013. Even though UKIP has so far failed to perform anywhere near 
this well in general elections, it has continuously increased its vote-share since 1997 and the 
party’s 919,471 votes in the 2010 election represented 3.1% of the total, making it the 
strongest British party without a seat in Westminster. Factoring in the predicted increase of 
votes for UKIP in the European elections of 2014, even if it fails to win a seat in Westminster 
in 2015, many Conservatives worry that by further increasing its vote, it could effectively 
hand the election to Labour by costing Tory candidates in marginal seats valuable votes.  
 
The Tory response: now and then 
These recent developments – and the fact that UKIP is not seen by potential voters as 
anything like as extremist as the NF and the BNP – mean that the need for a response and the 
nature of that response have become pressing questions for Tory strategists. Beyond its 
famously cheery and straight-talking leader, UKIP’s appeal boils down to a sense among 
those left behind by social, economic and political change that the country needs to return to 
the comforting certainties of a pre-politically correct, multicultural Britain, its signature issues 
to the EU and immigration, (see Ford and Goodwin, 2014 and Ashcroft, 2013). Presumably, 
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then, the Conservative’s responses need to engage their rival on the right on precisely this 
territory. 
 
The Tories’ strategy on the question of European integration, however, has evolved into a 
drama of its own, dividing the party and forcing David Cameron’s into promising to hold a 
referendum on Britain’s EU-membership. With the “referendum card” played, there is little if 
any space remaining for further movement to the right on that issue unless the Party were to 
campaign full-throatedly for the UK to leave the EU – something which seems unlikely at the 
moment. This, then, draws attention to the other fundamental topic on the populist radical 
right’s agenda, namely immigration and ethnic diversity, a question that, like Europe, has also 
been debated among Conservatives since at least the late 1950s. Certainly, many 
commentators had no doubt that the government’s announcement of a bill including stricter 
measures on immigration, which followed UKIP’s stunning local election and by-election 
performances in early 2013, constituted a clear indication of the Tories’ willingness to make 
policy concessions to UKIP in order to help secure some sort of Tory-led government after 
the 2015 elections. The mounting of high-profile stop-and-search campaigns to find illegal 
immigrants, the hiring of vans to trail posters encouraging illegal immigrants to hand 
themselves into the authorities , the attempts to limit free movement for unqualified 
immigrants and the plans to cut back social security and child benefit for selected groups of 
foreigners seemed to confirm those suspicions. 
 
Of course, the Conservative Party has a long record of adopting restrictive policies and often 
populist rhetoric on immigration (see Bale, 2012 and Bale and Partos, forthcoming, for 
details). Indeed, from the late 1960s onwards, the Tories were generally seen, in polls at least, 
as the best party to handle immigration by voters who were largely opposed to the idea – a 
reputation reinforced over the years by controversial (if not always officially sanctioned) 
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interventions by high-profile Conservative politicians (Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’, Margaret 
Thatcher’s ‘swamped’, Norman Tebbit’s ‘cricket test’, William Hague’s ‘foreign land’ and 
Michael Howard’s ‘are you thinking what we’re thinking?’), as well as restrictive legislation 
(most obviously, the British Nationality Act of 1981). True, David Cameron’s elevation to the 
leadership of the Conservative Party initially signalled a fresh approach to immigration and 
asylum as part of a broader “decontamination” strategy which hoped to render the 
Conservative Party more attractive to small-l liberal voters without in the end alienating its 
more conservative core. In reality, however, he introduced a dual-track approach, reducing 
some of the aggression and intensity around the issue while at the same time tightening policy 
to the extent of promising to reduce non-EU net migration to the tens of thousands (Bale, 
Hampshire and Partos, 2011, 399, 402).  
 
The Conservatives’ return to power in 2010, however, was only a partial success. The slightly 
increased popularity of UKIP in 2010 supposedly harmed Tory candidates in a number of 
constituencies and, in the view of many right-wingers in the party anyway, contributed to the 
Conservatives being denied an overall majority and being forced into a coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats – even if that coalition’s policies on immigration and integration turned 
out to run (with the exception of an end to the routine detention of children for immigration 
purposes) entirely along Conservative lines (Hampshire and Bale, forthcoming). Given the 
number of Conservative MPs and media outlets expressing this opinion, and given the 
Conservative Party’s failure to convince its critics that it is likely to significantly improve 
upon its electoral performance in 2015, some sort of ratcheting up of already fairly restrictive 
measures is an obvious response to UKIP’s rise in the opinion polls. Indeed, the fact that the 
latter seemed to go into reverse (albeit remaining in double figures) in the wake of the 
government’s announcement in the spring of 2013 that it was planning another Immigration 
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Bill may even have strengthened the argument of those who favour matching (or at least 
coming close to matching) UKIP’s offer. 
 
The swiftness and nature of the Conservatives’ response suggests that those, including 
Cameron, who might have been expected to point out the risks entailed – alienating small-l 
liberals by undermining the decontamination strategy established in opposition – have lost 
both their voices and the argument. Whether this is or is not a good thing for the country may 
be an important debate but it is not our main concern. Instead, we confine ourselves to asking 
whether it will ultimately be a good thing for the Conservatives’ capacity to overcome a threat 
on its flank that is clearly far more serious than any it has previously faced. One way of doing 
this (although clearly not the only way) is to draw on what happened when another highly 
successful mainstream centre-right party not only tried to match the offer of the populist 
radical right but ultimately invited it to join it in government – something that some Tories 
would clearly have to consider should UKIP ever make it into parliament and the 
Conservatives again fall short of an overall majority.  
 
Lessons from the heartland: the Austrian People’s Party and the populist radical right 
threat  
As with the British Conservatives, the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) has always been the 
natural voice for conservative electorate and has long been the main party political player on 
the Austrian centre-right (Müller, 1994, 57). Its position on that side of the spectrum was 
seemingly impregnable, even if the changing structure of the electorate (Müller and 
Steininger, 1994, 4-8) from the late 1960s favoured majorities for the centre left Social 
Democrats, the SPÖ, which presided over single party governments from 1970 to 1983 and a 
coalition government with the Freedom Party – the FPÖ, then more of a national-liberal than 
the populist radical right party it was to become under the leadership of Jörg Haider (Luther, 
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2000, 428-9, Debus, 2005) – between 1983 and 1986. In fact, the Austrian post-war party 
system for almost three decades effectively resembled a Westminster-type, bipolar pattern of 
competition, with the SPÖ and the ÖVP dominating the political system and with the FPÖ 
playing only a minor role. Owing to this “limping” two-party system (Pelinka and 
Rosenberger, 2000, 135), both mainstream parties were mainly oriented towards mainstream-
party competition, moderated by the countervailing patterns of Austrian consociationalism.1  
Systemic transformations since 1986, however, changed the competitive nature of Austrian 
party politics. With the permanent establishment of the far left Austrian Greens and – more 
importantly – the FPÖ’s successful shift to a PRRP-profile, both mainstream parties were 
confronted with pressure from the fringes, especially from the increasing success of a 
restructured FPÖ. Continuous voter defection caused a growing threat to the ÖVP and the 
responses applied by the party covered just about the entire spectrum of strategic options, 
helping to ensure that they provide lessons for centre-right parties elsewhere, including the 
UK.  
 
The pariah strategy 
The removal of the FPÖ’s liberal party leadership in 1986 precipitated by Jörg Haider and his 
faction was far more than a purely internal shift; it had remarkable consequences for the party 
system as a whole. It led to the dissolution of the existing SPÖ/FPÖ government coalition, 
immediate snap elections and mainstream parties being ’forced‘ into a Grand Coalition after 
20 years of fierce opposition. The FPÖ’s doubling of its vote share (to 9.7%) coupled with its 
strategy of ‘fundamental opposition’ (Pelinka, 2013, 7) led to an immediate – and some might 
say natural – response. To the system’s existing players, the FPÖ was a pariah and so had to 
be isolated at all costs – a decision that Haider challenged in ever more impressive style, 
aiming to force one of the mainstream parties to abandon their approach eventually (Luther, 
2011, 456). 
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Initially, however, the isolation strategy comprised both the political and the policy dimension 
of competition. Operationally both mainstream parties were tied to the coalition and (by and 
large) to a mutual non-aggression pact; in policy-terms the main issues of the early Haider-
FPÖ (anti-‘Proporz‘, anti-elitism, etc.) offered little room for mainstream party manoeuvre 
since to have adopted them would have compromised their very own clientele (Murphy, 2004, 
298-9). However, although the strategy of isolation was maintained on the federal level, in the 
provinces things weren’t quite as consistent – most prominently in the southern province of 
Carinthia, where Haider became governor in 1989 after a regional-level pact between the 
ÖVP and FPÖ overturned the hitherto absolute majority of the Carinthian SPÖ. However, the 
resignation of Haider only two years later (in the wake of his effective endorsement of the 
Third Reich’s employment policy) seemed to confirm mainstream parties’ commitment to 
isolating his party at the federal level at least (Luther, 2000, 429). Even though the FPÖ had 
grown to 16.6% in the 1990 federal elections, it remained a pariah, with both mainstream 
party leaders, Franz Vranitzky (SPÖ) and Erhard Busek (ÖVP) openly expressing their 
disapproval throughout the early 1990s (Pelinka, 2013, 2-3).  
 
By the end of the 1980s, however, immigration and ethnic diversity – in Austria commonly 
labelled the ‘foreigner question’ (Ausländerfrage) – had not only become a major issue for the 
FPÖ (and, interestingly, the Greens) but had also started to matter to mainstream parties. In 
the wake of the fall of the Wall, the beginning of the Yugoslavian conflict and an economic 
boom, the number of foreign-nationals resident in Austria had increased by 80% in just four 
years from 390,000 people in 1989 to 690,000 in 1993 (Münz, Zuser and Kytir, 2003, 25). A 
number of restrictive policy measures introduced by the Grand Coalition effectively limited 
further labour migration and tightened the asylum regime (Bauböck, 1998, 20-3), although 
publicly both the SPÖ and ÖVP maintained their isolation stance vis-a-vis the FPÖ. Having 
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obtained some of their policy demands, however, FPÖ-strategists simply perfected their game 
of outbidding mainstream parties. Whenever the SPÖ or ÖVP introduced further restrictions, 
the FPÖ, able to rely on widespread and long-lasting anti-immigrant feeling (Rosenberger and 
Seeber, 2010, 180-5), simply called for further and stronger measures – calls which 
culminated in an “Austria first” petition introduced by the FPÖ in 1993, demanding a full 
immigration stop, identity card requirements for foreigners and more police to fight illegal 
immigration. In the 1994-election, the FPÖ won 22.5% of the vote, while ongoing losses for 
the ÖVP (which went from 41.3% of the vote in 1986 to 32.1% in 1990 and then 27.7% in 
1994) not only meant the end for its leader, Erhard Busek, it also saw the end of the party’s 
commitment to isolating the FPÖ as a pariah.  
 
Adoption and co-option 
It was the newly selected conservative leader, Wolfgang Schüssel, who from 1995 onwards 
broke the mainstream parties’ consensus on the FPÖ and began to consider cooperation with 
the ÖVP’s radical right rival. When Schüssel terminated the coalition agreement with the SPÖ 
in 1995, he reportedly talked to the President of the Republic, Thomas Klestil, about a direct 
shift to a ÖVP/FPÖ-government before calling the snap election which Klestil’s refusal to 
consider the option effectively precipitated (Sperl, 2000, 36). After the election both 
mainstream parties were compelled to form another Grand Coalition, but by the end of the 
decade both were showing signs of moving towards the FPÖ’s agenda. Although the cordon 
sanitaire remained the SPÖ’s official policy, the party’s actual decisions in government, 
where it controlled the Interior Ministry (the equivalent of the Home Office) suggested it was 
prepared to take a much harder line on immigration. The ÖVP went even further. It not only 
continuously sniped at its coalition partner for being a soft touch on the issue; it also officially 
abandoned its exclusionary approach to the FPÖ. At the 1999 election, the ÖVP’s manifesto 
 12 
adopted its most restrictive stance on immigration to date (Gruber, 2014, 159-161) and 
Schüssel refused to rule out any coalition with the radical right.  
 
The result was that the FPÖ achieved its highest result ever, beating the ÖVP, which then 
invited it into coalition – a move which initially attracted sanctions from the European Union. 
The first Schüssel cabinet not only brought in but celebrated further restrictions on 
immigration and introduced a controversial ‘Integration agreement’, compelling new 
immigrants to pass language and culture tests within the first four years of their arrival 
(Luther, 2003, 138; Perchinig, 2006, 296-8). These moves, combined with the so-called 
‘strategy of embrace’ (Umarmungsstrategie) of the radical right initially appeared to pay 
dividends for the ÖVP in 2002. Finding it difficult – not untypically, perhaps, for a radical 
party with little recent experience of government – to cope with the cares of office, the FPÖ 
got tangled up in internal arguments, encouraging Schüssel to call a snap election at which 
many former FPÖ voters, disillusioned by the party’s squabbles, switched directly to the ÖVP 
(Picker, Salfinger and Zeglovits, 2004) allowing the ÖVP to achieve what by then was a 
phenomenal 42.3% while the FPÖ crashed to just 10%. 
 
The ÖVP appeared to have found a solution to its enduring problem with the PRR (Heinisch, 
2004, 257-9, Luther, 2003, 144-5). As it turned out, however, that solution was anything but 
lasting. After re-establishing another government coalition with the now depleted FPÖ, the 
second Schüssel-cabinet essentially picked up where it left off, further securitizing the debate 
on immigration by discussing it in terms of international cooperation against crime and 
terrorism (Gruber, 2014, 161-5). Even more controversial was its approach to asylum: 
amongst other measures, it restricted the rights of refugee care, it broadened the list of safe 
third countries and it assigned the private company “European Homecare” for repatriation 
counselling and organizing the management of asylum seekers in Austria’s main refugee 
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centre, thereby cutting support for those NGOs that had been stepping into help heretofore 
(Langthaler and Trauner, 2009, 464). It also actively promoted a restrictive policy in the 
European Council (Bauböck and Perchinig, 2003, 22) and in 2005 the cabinet presented and 
then passed a comprehensive and clearly restrictive reform package, including alien and 
immigration laws but also asylum and citizenship laws (Schuhmacher, 2007). 
 
Electorally, however, this ratcheting up of restrictions did not pay the expected dividend. In 
2006, the ÖVP lost to the SPÖ and fell to what by then was regarded as something like its 
trend rate of 34% of the vote, forcing it into another Grand Coalition which lasted for just two 
years. And although it used time in office, and in particular its control of the Interior Ministry 
to maintain tough stances on immigration, integration and asylum, it gained only 26% of the 
vote at the snap election of 2008, its worst result in the whole post-war era. Meanwhile, the 
populist radical right had split into two parties in 2005, with many of those who had been in 
government joining Haider in newly established Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis 
Zukunft Österreich or BZÖ), while other supposedly less moderate supporters remained in the 
FPÖ. But rather than imploding completely, the FPÖ began to recover its strength and vitality. 
While at the 2006 election, still scarred by their recent struggles and splits, both parties only 
achieved a combined 15% of the vote, only two years later they were back at a combined 
28.2%, and were thus even stronger – and in the FPÖ’s case even more aggressive – than they 
had been in 1999 when co-opted and supposedly emasculated by being invited into 
government.  
 
Striking a balance 
The six-year experience of a coalition with the populist radical right and the electoral price 
paid for it left its mark on the ÖVP and prompted something of a rethink on immigration and 
integration. Although the party’s strategy on asylum has hardly moved, there has been change 
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in other areas, signalling the end of a purely adaptive approach to the populist radical right. 
After years of alienating non-governmental organizations, including those traditionally linked 
to it, by its hard-line asylum policy, the ÖVP began to change its tune on another aspect of 
immigration politics, namely migrant integration. Under new party leader Joseph Pröll, the 
ÖVP-led Ministry of the Interior promoted a consultation process that encompassed federal, 
regional and local political authorities, NGOs, social scientists and economic stakeholders, 
with the aim of working out a ’National Action Plan for Integration’ (Götzelmann, 2010, 200-
205). It marked a step back to the semi-corporatist approach Austria had been following for so 
many decades, with the new ÖVP-leadership now arguing that this approach might have some 
potential to undermine the populist radical right’s hold over the issues concerned.  
 
When Michael Spindelegger took over as ÖVP leader in 2011, he even intensified this new, 
dual approach by creating a government portfolio for integration – the State Secretariat for 
Integration (Staatssekretariat für Integration, SSI) within the Interior Ministry. Although 
formally responsible to the latter and provided with only limited financial resources, the logic 
behind this step quickly became evident. While the SSI, the leadership of which was handed 
to the 25 year-old youth spokesmen of the ÖVP in Vienna, explicitly limited its task to the 
‘integration of permanent residents with a migrant background’, it left the issues of Asylum 
and Migration Control almost entirely to the Ministry of the Interior, headed up by Johanna 
Mikl-Leitner, well-known in the ÖVP as a hardliner on such issues. While the Interior 
Ministry has maintained its tough stance, especially on asylum, the SSI has organised a 
myriad of short-range projects together with first steps on the legislative level, rebranding the 
question of integration under a meritocratic narrative of “individual contribution” (Leistung), 
one of the centre-right’s most traditional ideological catch-phrases. Whereas, during its 
coalition with the FPÖ, the party had focused on cultural measures of “civic integration” 
based on migrants language skills, country knowledge and adoption of mainstream values, it 
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now demanded and promoted more active contributions by migrants, such as better 
educational achievement, more active participation in the labour market and joining 
associations and institutions (Gruber and Mattes, forthcoming). This narrative fits into the 
government’s recent approach on economic immigration, which has been redesigned as a 
points-based system. Indeed, by practically limiting labour migration to highly skilled people, 
specialised personnel and ‘key-workers’ in sectors of shortage occupation, the immigration 
regime is pretty much in line with the “best-and-brightest” doctrine that currently 
characterises the approach of the UK and other Western democracies, even if it receives far 
less attention in the media than the more contested aspects of asylum and integration.  
 
The ÖVP hoped that its more recent dual track approach would simultaneously satisfy 
widespread public support for restrictive approaches to immigration, integration and asylum 
and yet avoid damage to the economy and keep on board liberal and/or compassionate 
conservatives. If, however, it has achieved this it has done little or nothing to mitigate the 
threat from the populist radical right. True, the 2013 election saw the BZÖ – deprived of its 
charismatic leader Haider and unsuccesfullly attempting to turn itself into a more mainstream 
liberal party – lose all its seats in parliament, having just failed to reach the 4% threshold. 
However, the FPÖ, led by the charismatic Heinz-Christian Strache, climbed to 20.5% 
(electorally esablishing as the strongest amongst European Radical Right parties) and would 
almost certainly have topped that result, had more than half a million voters not been attracted 
by two new entrants – Team Stronach for Austria, led by the eponymous ex-pat businessman 
Frank Stronach, which scored 5.7% and NEOS – the New Austria, which managed 5%. The 
ÖVP dropped to just 24% - its lowest share of the vote since the war and one only just 
compensated for by an equally unimpressive performance by the SPÖ, especially given the 
strong possibility that the ÖVP will be caught in a pincer movement at the next election by 
NEOS to its liberal left and the FPÖ to its authoritarian right. 
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Learning the lessons from Austria 
In light of the experiences of the Austrian centre-right and its successes and failures in taming 
the populist radical right, what lessons might we draw when considering how the 
Conservatives could and should react to the challenge they face from UKIP? Sadly, for Tories 
out there hoping for a silver bullet solution, they are not so much constructive as something of 
a counsel of despair. 
 
To begin with, the Austrian experience suggests that treating the populist radical right as some 
sort of pariah (“a bunch of ... fruitcakes and loonies and closet racists”, as Mr Cameron once 
put it) is not ultimately a sustainable strategy – particularly if the mainstream party in question 
finds, as the Conservative Party has found, that its efforts to do so are undermined not only by 
the media but by people within its own ranks promoting the idea of deals with said pariah. 
Unfortunately, however, the Austrian experience also suggests that imitating the pariah’s 
policies and/or bringing it in from the cold is not a particularly successful approach either. It 
is by no means guaranteed that shifts towards a more restrictive immigration, integration and 
asylum policy will actually help to recapture lost votes – and they may well scare off other 
voters, be they liberals of the economic or the social variety. Even worse, there is a distinct 
possibility – one much discussed in Austria but not sufficiently considered (at least in the 
media) in Britain – that ‘banging on’ about the radical right’s signature issues, rather than 
neutralising it, only serves to prime voters to think those issues are even more pressing than 
they already clearly think they are. If that happens, support for UKIP is likely to rise rather 
than fall – or at least to stay at a level which will not simply prevent the Conservatives 
capturing marginals from Labour but may actually assist Labour in capturing marginals from 
the Conservatives.  
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And then there is ‘credibility’ – an important political currency on the basis of which parties 
and politicians are evaluated by voters. Part of this image involves pursuing principles even if 
current trends might suggest casting them aside. For Cameron and his colleagues, forgetting 
all about decontamination and responding to UKIP’s recent gains by ‘lurching to the right’ 
can of course be portrayed as ‘listening to the people’. But it can also look like panic, raising 
the question, even among voters ill-disposed towards immigration, of why it took UKIP to do 
so well in polls and second-order elections before the government acted? It is also possible 
that those voters who have switched to UKIP might pick up on the tactical intent behind this 
shift and reward UKIP for its influence rather than the Conservatives for caving in. 
Experience from Austria suggests that drastic shifts on immigration and integration merely 
increase the electorate’s suspicion that mainstream parties are simply playing politics, making 
them less likely to believe they really care, let alone have any consistent, deliverable policies 
on the issue. Austria, especially in recent years, also shows us that trying to have it both ways 
– talking tough on asylum and ‘bad’ immigration while promoting integration and an open 
market for highly-skilled workers – may not help the centre-right much in this respect either, 
at least in the short term. No surprise, then, that the Conservatives’ attempts to do just that 
seem to have made very little impression on those Tory voters who appear to have jumped 
ship to UKIP. 
 
Austrian experience also suggests that such shifts stand little chance of converting many of 
those voters who would vote for radical right parties anyway. Since those parties can make a 
good claim to ‘own’ the issues of immigration, integration and asylum, adopting their agenda 
risks confirming rather than eroding their reputation for speaking truth to power. The ÖVP’s 
experience is unequivocal in this regard. The Conservatives have and will always fail to 
outbid UKIP when it comes to its core issues, such as immigration or, indeed, the EU, 
because, like Austria’s populist radical right, it will always be able – and willing – to go one 
 18 
step further. In fact, every step in its direction will allow UKIP, like the FPÖ, to sell that 
development as an achievement of its own, demonstrating its ability to influence mainstream 
parties to ‘do the right thing’, therefore making it worth voting for even if it stands little 
chance of getting into parliament and government. Meanwhile, if economists who argue that 
immigration is actually a net positive for the country are correct, then any mainstream party 
which takes too restrictive a stance is essentially denying both the nation and itself the 
benefits of higher growth. 
 
But it is not only its consequences for votes and policy that makes such a strategy hazardous, 
it has consequences for getting into and staying in government too. The ÖVP, operates in a 
PR system that (above the threshold anyway) directly converts support for the radical right 
into seats in parliament; thus, if the FPÖ does well enough, as it did for example in 1999, then 
there is always a possibility of a right-wing coalition. The Conservatives, however, lack such 
a safety net – one that that might allow them, like some of their sister parties in other parts of 
Europe, to gain or hang onto power even with a relatively unimpressive vote share. In the 
(admittedly still unlikely) event that UKIP were to manage to win seats in Westminster at the 
2015 election, first past the post would almost certainly see to it that its haul was insufficient 
to facilitate the formation of a Tory-led coalition or minority government. Turning around the 
telescope for a moment, the Tories also need to worry about the possibility that cosying up too 
closely to UKIP might hamper another deal with the Liberal Democrats, who, unless they 
really are prepared to be the gift that keeps on giving to their coalition partners, have probably 
conceded just about as much as they are likely to concede on immigration and on Europe. In 
the longer run, and assuming, for the sake of argument, that a run of hung parliaments 
eventually produces irresistible pressure for a change of electoral systems rather than 
provokes a frustrated electorate to award one of the mainstream parties with a massive 
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majority simply in order to break the deadlock, the Austrian experience suggests that co-
option of the populist radical right is no more than a temporary solution anyway. 
 
Given all this, the obvious lesson from Austria for British Conservatives is a simple one – but 
no less important for that. They should avoid investing too much time, effort and attention in 
trying to cure a condition that, in all likelihood, can only be managed. UKIP can hardly be 
dismissed as a distraction.  But nor is it going to be easy to dispose of – not if it continues to 
be well-led and well-covered by a fascinated (and often friendly) media, and not while there 
are significant proportions of the electorate uncomfortable with the cultural social and 
economic changes which globalisation, as well as partisan and class dealignment, make 
inevitable. After all, UKIP is no anomaly; it is the British example of a Europe-wide 
phenomenon that no-one has yet found the answer to.  A degree of rhetorical reassurance 
from the Conservatives may help a little – but risks making things even worse if it leads to 
promises that can’t be kept and/or to alienating the many commercial enterprises which thrive 
on such changes and the many citizens who can cope with them. Better instead to focus 
instead on what mainstream centre-right parties generally do best – managing the economy, 
providing public services that are sufficient without being extravagant, balancing the concerns 
of traditionalist voters with the requirements of business, and painting their centre-left rivals 
as profligate soft-touches who couldn’t organise an alcoholic celebration in a factory 
producing beer. 
 
Mention of the latter brings us neatly to the only other thing that might help the Conservatives 
– a change of leader.  Studies of the electorate (Ford and Goodwin, 2014) and Tory Party 
members (Webb and Bale, forthcoming), strongly suggest that many of those tempted by 
UKIP are at least in part influenced by a feeling that David Cameron is an out-of-touch 
liberal, too far-removed from their idea of what a Conservative leader should be.  To do 
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anything about this in the short-term would be madness: it would look like panic and, in any 
case, it would be to ignore the fact that, to many other voters anyway, Cameron is a much 
more credible Prime Minister than any of his current rivals, inside or outside his own party.  If 
and when he steps down, however, choosing a successor whose background, instincts and 
demeanour are, shall we say, a little earthier than Mr Cameron’s might make things harder for 
UKIP than they have been lately. 
 
Conclusion  
The recent successes of UKIP in local and European elections have stimulated debate on its 
impact on established parties. Although the future of UKIP is anything but clear, general 
election results since the 1970s suggest that, in fits and starts, British voters are falling out of 
love with the big two and are willing to see smaller parties as viable options. Something 
similar happened in Austria from the 1980s onwards, although the effects there, partly 
because of the country’s PR electoral system, have been even more pronounced. They have 
led to an extensive transformation of the party system, establishing a successful populist 
radical right presence that has put pressure on Austrian mainstream parties, in particular the 
centre-right People’s Party (ÖVP). Until recently, the British Conservative Party has been 
shielded from, if not completely immune to, similar pressure. Recent shifts in immigration, 
integration and asylum policy, however, suggest a willingness not just to take a traditionally 
tougher stance than its mainstream Labour rival but also to engage in more explicit 
competition with its radical right rival. This article argues that the ÖVP’s experience should 
encourage the Tories to think very carefully indeed before going too far down that particular 
road.  
 
Outbidding Labour – a familiar Conservative strategy – is one thing. But different rules apply 
when it comes to UKIP, a party unconstrained by a progressive tradition or, indeed, the 
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likelihood of having to put its promises into practice. As the ÖVP found to its cost, 
challenging the populist radical right on its own pitch and playing by its rules raises the 
salience of its core issues, helps to legitimise its sometimes irrational assertions and 
assumptions, and encourages it simply to demand even more. For British Conservatives the 
consequences are, if anything, even more worrying. The number of UKIP voters or 
sympathisers in crucial constituencies who might be won round to the Conservative cause is 
quite small – almost certainly too small to help the Tories win an overall majority at 
Westminster in 2015. Moreover, without the safety-net of a potential centre-right/radical-
right-coalition (an option most of its continental sister parties have to hand), the 
Conservatives’ play for the populist vote is effectively an uninsured adventure holiday – one 
that not only risks harming rather than boosting the party’s chances of winning an overall 
majority but also handicapping a sluggish British economy in a period of European economic 
crisis. Given the careful efforts to reshape the Tory brand during Cameron’s time in 
opposition, the Party’s recent relapse into anti-immigration populism gives the lie to talk of 
‘decontamination’ and risks reviving the old image of the ‘nasty party’. However, with an 
even ‘nastier’ party now on the scene, this relapse could come at a high price. Populist radical 
right parties like UKIP will always be able to up the ante, and trying to adopt their rhetoric 
and their policies, while it may be tempting in the short term, is not a long term solution to 
eliminating or at least minimizing the threat they pose. Indeed it may be a fool’s errand. 
Whether the Conservatives are capable of learning the lessons from overseas examples in 
general, and Austria in particular, remains to be seen. 
                                                          
1 Consociational democracies are characterised by a government that is vitally linked to elite 
cartels, dedicated to stabilising a fragmented political culture (Lijphart 1969, p. 216). As a 
consequence, political conflicts are moderated by compromise or amicable agreement 
amongst elites and government officials, leading to depoliticization of contentious issues. 
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Government itself tends towards Grand Coalitions that strive for proportionality in the 
distribution of government jobs and resources. 
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